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Introduction
Coordination problems arise in many organizations, and their resolution may determine the success or failure of the entire organization. Organizations may be successful in coordinating on a good outcome, or they may become trapped in an inecient situation even though better outcomes are also potentially stable.
Few coordination problems are as stark as those arising in the minimum eort game (also called weakest-link game). In this game, all players simultaneously make a choice; each player's choice can be interpreted as eort and a player's payo depends on his or her own choice as well as on the minimum choice in the group.
1 This game is a coordination game with multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria: any situation where all players make the same eort is a Nash equilibrium, but equilibria with a higher eort level have greater payos for all players.
Pareto dominance (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988) has been proposed as the primary equilibrium selection criterion in coordination games. However, this criterion turned out to have limited predictive power in the minimum eort game. Van Huyck et al. (1990) were the rst to study this game experimentally and show that failure to coordinate on the ecient outcome is common in the laboratory. They pointed out that this coordination failure 2 is due to the severe eects of strategic uncertainty in this game: if there is a chance that any of the other players may choose a lower eort level, choosing a high eort may no longer be a best response. These experimental ndings have been conrmed by later studies (see Camerer, 2003, Ch. 7, and Devetag and an overview) and have led to an active research agenda to nd a way to raise eciency through changing certain features of the game.
The prevalence of coordination failure is higher if the benets from coordinating on a higher eort are low relative to the cost of eort; coordination failure is also more likely with more players (Devetag and Ortmann, 2007) . A typical pattern of behavior found in minimum eort game experiments is that initially many subjects choose relatively high levels of eort, but after several rounds the majority choose a low eort. Coordination failure could be prevented if the game is modied from the beginning in order to avoid subjects sliding to a low eort level. However, it is also worth asking whether and how a group can restore coordination on a higher eort level, thus overcoming coordination failure after a history of being trapped in an inecient equilibrium. Most organizations have existed for a period of time and a mechanism that works with zero-experience groups might not work with groups that already have a history; for example, a device that is successful in a new company might not work in restructuring an old one.
1 Examples of such situations include the classical stag-hunt game (Rousseau, 1755) , and, more modernly, writing joint reports with several sections where completion of the report requires all sections to be completed (Weber et al., 2001 ) and airline departures, where for a plane to be able to depart several separate tasks must be completed (Knez and Simester, 2001 ).
2 Van Huyck et al. (1990) distinguish two possibilities for players failing to coordinate on the ecient equilibrium: playing a Pareto-dominated equilibrium instead or not choosing the same eort level at all. We will use the term coordination failure to refer to the rst situation, where subjects typically coordinate on the least ecient equilibrium.
The second situation will be referred to as mis-coordination.
In this paper we investigate equilibrium selection in a minimum eort game with a low benetto-cost ratio and focus on two leadership mechanisms to improve coordination. One mechanism involves cheap-talk (CT) one-way pre-play communication, where one of the group members acts as a leader by suggesting an eort level; after observing the suggestion, all players choose an eort level simultaneously. The second mechanism entails a rst-mover (FM) leader that leads by example. One player chooses an eort level prior to his followers, who observe this choice and then choose their own eort simultaneously. Both mechanisms are expected to help players to coordinate on a more ecient equilibrium since in both cases the leader's suggestion or choice may act as a focal point. In addition to the focal point eect, in the leading-by-example case, having the leader commit to an eort reduces the strategic uncertainty faced by the followers. On the other hand, the leader's commitment choice is more risky than a non-binding suggestion. Which mechanism is more successful overall is not clear a priori. A novel aspect of our experiment is to elicit responses of followers to all possible suggestions or choices by the leader using the strategy method. This allows us to analyze followers' behavior more systematically, and to conduct a counterfactual analysis of the eectiveness of the mechanisms.
Mechanisms similar to the ones we use have been applied previously to prevent coordination failure.
For a stag-hunt two-player game, Cooper et al. (1992) nd that one-way pre-play communication of a non-binding intention to play improves coordination on the ecient equilibrium; two-way communication does even better. In a minimum eort game with more players, Blume and Ortmann (2007) nd that multilateral communication (all players sending a message of intention simultaneously) signicantly increases overall eciency relative to the baseline treatment without cheap talk.
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For the leading-by-example mechanism, Cartwright et al. (2013) observe that it increases eort in a signicant number of groups, although not many groups reached the maximum possible eort.
4 Sahin et al. (2015) compare both mechanisms (one-way communication and leading-by-example) and nd that both lead to an increased group eort compared with the baseline treatment, and the magnitude of the increase is similar for both mechanisms.
The studies above show that both mechanisms are at least partially eective in preventing coordination failure in some parametrizations of the minimum eort game. 5 We study these mechanisms in a tougher environment in the sense of lower benets of coordination relative to the cost of eort, and we also study whether the mechanisms can overcome coordination failure 6 (without changing other aspects of the game) 7 . For this purpose we use the parametrization of the minimum eort 3 The result is sensitive to the cost and clarity of messages, as Manzini et al. (2009) and Kriss et al. (2012) nd.
4 Weber et al. (2004) consider a situation in which all subjects move sequentially, and nd that subjects are more likely to coordinate on a high-eort equilibrium.
5 Other mechanisms that have been shown to be able to prevent coordination failure in minimum eort games to some extent include advice from previous cohorts of players (Chaudhuri et al., 2009) , post-play disapproval messages (Dugar, 2010) , and inducing social identity (Chen and Chen, 2011). 6 Weber et al. (2001) introduce a one-o cheap-talk leader intervention after two rounds of play, hence their experiment does not exactly t with either preventing or overcoming coordination failure. This intervention was not successful in leading to a high eort in large groups. Cartwright et al. (2013) have sessions where leadership by example is introduced after subjects have played the simultaneous game; however, the groups are re-shued, hence subjects in the group do not have a common history of coordination failure.
7 There are several studies on the eect of introducing nancial incentives to overcome coordination failure, possibly game introduced by Brandts and Cooper (2006) to induce coordination failure in the absence of any mechanism. In our experiment leaders are chosen randomly 8 and the leader-communicator in our cheap-talk mechanism can only suggest an eort level rather than send a more complicated message.
9 Our implementations of the leadership mechanisms are thus minimal as they do not require extended messages or (potentially costly) tests to determine who is going to be the leader.
By using a challenging environment (especially after a history of coordination failure) and minimal implementations of the mechanisms, we explore the limits of what these mechanisms can achieve.
After having conrmed that coordination failure happens in our tough environment without a mechanism present, we nd that this history of coordination failure is a powerful attractor, and the leadership mechanisms fail to provide a means to overcome it in the long run. Nevertheless, shortly after the introduction of the mechanisms, average eort is higher as some subjects do attempt to make use of the mechanisms. Even without a history of coordination failure, both types of leadership have only a limited ability to prevent it in this environment, with about 30-40% of the groups avoiding their minimum eort sliding to the lowest level.
Given the relatively poor performance of the mechanisms in terms of escaping from and even preventing coordination failure, what are the reasons for this? Is it due to an ineective leadership or to the reluctance of other players to follow? We nd that followers do follow the leader's suggestion or choice to some extent (more in the rst-mover than in the cheap-talk mechanisms, and more without a history of coordination failure) but there is a sizable minority that always chooses the lowest possible eort. We also nd that not all leaders dare to choose a high eort (even after they have suggested it); hence, both leaders and followers can be blamed for the poor performance to some degree. Using the data from the strategy method, even if leaders had chosen a higher eort, they would not have increased their payo. The presence in a group of just one player who is not responsive to the leader's suggestion or choice makes it impossible to avoid coordination failure, as it is then individually rational for a leader and for any of the followers to choose the lowest possible eort.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a general background on the minimum eort game and a discussion of possible eects of the leadership mechanisms. Section 3 describes the experimental design and hypotheses. The results of the experiment are discussed in section 4 and section 5 concludes.
together with communication Cooper, 2006, 2007; Hamman et al., 2007; Brandts et al., , 2014 . The increase in the benets of coordination is found to improve eciency, although to a lesser degree than communication.
Eciency is also found to increase once post-play monetary punishment is introduced (Le Lec et al., 2014). 8 Alternative ways of choosing a leader can involve letting players volunteer to be the leader (Cartwright et al., 2013) , elections (Brandts et al., 2014) or administering a test (Sahin et al., 2015) .
9 Free-form communication by a leader is found to shift group eort to a more ecient level in Brandts et al. (2014) .
2 Eects of leadership in the minimum eort game
The minimum eort game
In the minimum eort game there are n players. Player i's strategy is denoted by x i ∈ X i ⊆ R + , where X i is a nite set. Players' strategies can be interpreted as eort levels. The payo function of player i is:
where a, b, c are exogenous constants with b > c > 0.
Any strategy prole in which all players in the group choose the same eort is a Nash equilibrium.
A unilateral increase in x i incurs a cost without changing the minimum. A unilateral decrease in x i reduces the minimum; the eect of this reduction outweighs the saving on cost since b > c. The multiple Nash equilibria in the game can be Pareto-ranked according to the players' choice: any equilibrium with a higher choice Pareto-dominates any equilibrium with a lower choice.
Every player choosing the highest possible eort is the payo-dominant equilibrium and thus it would be selected by Harsanyi and Selten's (1988) primary selection criterion. However, choosing a high eort is risky because a player may incur a large cost if the group's minimum eort happens to be low. There is a conict between the appealing Pareto-eciency property of everybody choosing the highest possible eort and the insurance value for an individual player of choosing the lowest eort. The lower uncertainty associated with the choice of a lower eort is related to Harsanyi and Selten's (1988) secondary risk-dominance selection criterion. One generalization of this criterion to n-player potential games (of which the minimum eort game is an example) is maximization of the potential function (Monderer and Shapley, 1996; Goeree and Holt, 2005) . In the minimum eort game, maximization of the potential selects coordination on the highest eort level if n < b/c and on the lowest eort level if n > b/c. 10
Eects of leadership
In a game with multiple equilibria, players' beliefs about the strategies of the other players play an important role in equilibrium selection. We will discuss how our two leadership mechanisms, while not altering the payo function of the game, can aect players' beliefs and therefore possibly change their behavior allowing coordination on a dierent equilibrium. In our experiment we have three types of games based on the payo function above but diering in the dynamic structure. The baseline game is the simultaneous game, where all players make their choices at the same time. The other two games correspond to our mechanisms. Recall that in the cheap-talk (CT) mechanism, an exogenously chosen player (the leader-communicator) rst sends a message from the set X i of possible eort levels. This message is interpreted as a suggestion to the players. The message is seen by all players; then all players (the leader and the n − 1 followers) choose an eort level simultaneously.
10 Evidence from experimental studies tends to support this prediction (Goeree and Holt, 2005; Chen and Chen, 2011 ).
In the rst-mover (FM) mechanism an exogenously chosen leader makes the choice rst. The other n − 1 players (followers) observe this choice and then make their choices simultaneously. Cartwright et al. (2013) , who discuss only the game corresponding to our FM game, oer two reasons why leadership may increase the minimum eort in the group. First, the leader's choice may act as a focal point that facilitates coordination. Second, the leader's choice reduces the strategic uncertainty faced by the followers, who are now eectively playing a coordination game with n − 1 players. Both eects are present in our FM game but only the focal point eect is present in our CT game; our analysis makes clear the dierences between the two games.
Let F i (k) denote player i's beliefs about the probability that another player will choose an eort level of at least k in the simultaneous game. Then i's beliefs about the probability that the minimum eort of the n − 1 other players is at least k is given by
Suppose that in our CT game the players observe a suggested eort L. Denote by F CT i (k|L) player i's beliefs about the probability that a follower's eort in the CT game is at least k conditional on suggestion L. We represent the focality eect by assuming F CT i (k|L) ≥ F i (k) for all k ≤ L and for all L. This means that, for eort levels smaller than L, i believes that the distribution shifts towards higher levels.
11 Because the leader still needs to choose an eort level, we assume that other players' beliefs treat the leader as one more follower. In our FM game, where L is the leader's eort choice, the above focality eect is also present. Arguably, the eect is no weaker in FM, where the leader is committed to L, than in CT, where the leader still can make a dierent choice. Hence we assume 
for all k ≤ L and for all L. 12 If all players' beliefs satisfy Assumption 1, then
Hence, for a xed L, the optimal eort level in FM for follower i will be at least as high as the optimal eort level in CT. Therefore, one can expect that the distribution of followers' choices in FM is at least as high as in CT.
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Turning to the comparison with the choices in the simultaneous game,
Denote the optimal choice in the simultaneous game, given the beliefs M i (k), byk i , the optimal follower's choice in CT given L ask CT i (L),
11 It seems natural to also assume that for eort levels strictly above L the distribution shifts towards L; however, we do not need this assumption in what follows.
12 Notice that the lower exponent n − 2 in FM represents the reduction in strategic uncertainty compared with CT. 13 This further justies the assumption F
and the optimal follower's choice in FM ask 
If a player would nd it optimal to choosek i > L in the simultaneous game, the player would not nd it optimal to choose an eort below L as a follower in CT or FM because the focality assumption means that the minimum eort of the other players is less likely to be strictly below L. We summarize the above reasoning as Lemma 1 Suppose all players' beliefs satisfy assumption 1 and let L be the leader's suggestion/choice.
Let us now turn to the leader's choice. Suppose the leader's beliefs satisfy assumption 1. In addition,
we assume that the leader believes that higher eorts are more likely after a higher suggestion/choice.
Formally, for both leadership games
Could the leader's optimal choice be lower than the choice in the simultaneous game? Consider again player i with beliefs M i (k) in the simultaneous game, whose optimal choice is denoted bŷ
Take L =k i and L <k i . Using assumption 2, the dierence in expected payos for the leader between these choices is Eu i (
Therefore no L <k i can be optimal in FM for player i as the leader. For CT, the same reasoning shows that if the leader is restricted to choose eort equal to suggestion, then the optimal choice (and therefore suggestion) is at leastk i . 16
In CT, the leader is not restricted to choose an eort equal to his/her own suggestion L. Recall that assumption 2 means that the distribution of eorts is expected to be higher after a higher L. The assumption implies that the leader would nd it optimal to suggest the highest L possible but not necessarily follow it.
17 The leader's actual eort would not be belowk i because the focality eect 14 This goes some way in justifying the assumption
16 Without assumption 2 it need not be the case than the optimal leader's choice L ≥ki. Consider the parametrization of the minimum eort game in section 3 that we use in the experiment. Proposition 1 Suppose all players' beliefs satisfy assumptions 1 and 2. Then the minimum group eort with a leader cannot be lower than the minimum group eort in the simultaneous game.
Given our assumptions, if a player whosek i would have determined the minimum eort in the simultaneous game is acting as a leader, we have shown that this player's eort would not be lower thank i (lemma 2). Other players may lower their eort but not belowk i (lemma 1). If a player whosek i was strictly above the minimum eort in the simultaneous game acts as a leader, the players whose eort was abovek i (if any) again cannot have eort lower thank i as followers; the players whose eort was belowk i will not decrease their eort (lemma 1).
In our experiment we will test whether leadership, either in CT form or in FM form, increases eort. Comparing CT and FM games, if leaders were restricted to follow their own suggestion in CT, due to the reduction in strategic uncertainty and a greater focality in FM, one would expect that a higher eort in FM would shift beliefs more and therefore is more likely to be optimal and be chosen. Despite this intuition, it may be optimal for a leader to choose a higher eort in CT than in FM. Suppose that a high L shifts beliefs towards a medium level of eort by followers, whereas a medium L keeps beliefs low. Then the leader in FM would nd it optimal to choose a low level of eort. The leader in CT may nd it optimal to send a high L and then choose a medium eort level. Our assumptions do not exclude this possibility and therefore they do not have unambiguous implications for the comparison between minimum group eorts in CT and FM.
In the next section we describe our experimental design in more detail and formulate hypotheses based on the theoretical analysis of leadership mechanisms above.
3 Experimental procedures and hypotheses
Experimental design
The baseline game that we investigate is the minimum eort game introduced in Brandts and Cooper (2006) . There are four players and ve eort levels, x i ∈ {0, 10, 20, 30, 40}. Player i 's payo is given Table 1 shows the corresponding payo matrix. This payo matrix with ve Pareto-ranked equilibria along the main diagonal was used by Cooper (2006, 2007) , Hamman et al. (2007) and choices as well (a message is called self-signaling if the sender wants to send it if and only if it is true, see Farrell and Rabin, 1996) . Brandts et al. (2014) . It is an economical way of inducing coordination failure by making n b/c with a relatively small number of players, n = 4. 18 Table 1 The main part of the experiment consists of two blocks of ten rounds (see table 2 ). In each round, a group of participants play either the baseline game or one of the mechanisms, according to table 2. The group composition remains xed for the entire experiment. We divide experimental sessions according to the type of leadership mechanism and according to the timing of the introduction of the mechanism. Both mechanisms involve a randomly selected player (a leader) acting before others at the beginning of each round. The role of the leader is xed during the entire block. In our CT treatments, the leader suggests a number; after seeing this number all players (including the leader) simultaneously choose their eort level.
19
In the FM treatments, the leader makes an eort choice before the rest of the group. Having observed the leader's choice, the other players (the followers) make their eort choice simultaneously. We consider two scenarios for the timing of the introduction of the mechanisms. In Restore sessions, the mechanism is introduced in the second block, after the group has played the baseline minimum eort game for ten rounds. This simulates an attempt to turn around an existing organization that has (likely) experienced coordination failure (the turnaround game of Brandts and Cooper, 2006) .
In Prevent sessions, the order of the blocks is reversed: a group starts with a randomly assigned 18 Note that the game has a particularly low ratio of benets b from coordinating on a higher eort to cost c of eort, b/c = 1.2.
19 In the instructions, we specied that for the leader the choice ... is the one used to calculate the points, and it could be dierent from the suggested number. leader for ten rounds and then plays another block of ten rounds without a leader. We also run a control treatment in which no mechanism is used and the baseline game is played in all rounds.
At the end of each round, subjects are shown the group minimum eort from the current round and the eort levels selected by all subjects. These eorts are sorted from highest to lowest, so they cannot be traced to individual group members. The feedback format is similar to the one used by Brandts and Cooper (2006) . Note that all blocks have in common the number of rounds, the group size and the feedback after each round.
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In the mechanisms, we use the strategy method to elicit followers' decisions. Specically, we ask followers to enter an eort choice for each possible suggestion (in CT) or eort choice (in FM) of the leader. In this way we are able to collect data on followers' complete strategies rather than only on the choices in response to one actual suggestion/choice of the leader. With these strategies, we are able to test the theory about the followers' responses to dierent suggestions/choices of the leader and conduct a counterfactual analysis of group eort for dierent leader's choices.
Hypotheses
Based on our analysis of possible leadership eects in section 2, we formulate the following hypotheses.
22 According to proposition 1, leadership cannot lead to the minimum eort in a group with a leader being lower than if the players were choosing simultaneously. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 The minimum group eort is higher in CT and FM than in Baseline.
The history of the group is likely to aect players' beliefs F i (k). If beliefs are higher, then the chosen eort is also likely to be higher. Our Restore sessions are designed to induce coordination failure thus it can be expected that the beliefs are lower in Restore than in Prevent. The actual eorts are then also likely to be lower in Restore than in Prevent.
Hypothesis 2 The minimum group eort is lower in Restore than in Prevent, holding the treatment (CT or FM) constant.
The previous hypotheses, although formulated on the aggregate level of the group, are based on assumptions on individual behavior discussed in section 2. Our strategy method design is well suited to test whether the contingent strategies of the followers are consistent with the properties of individual behavior used in that discussion. Those properties were based on players' beliefs; it is natural to expect beliefs to be more optimistic in Prevent than after coordination failure in Restore, and we argued that beliefs are likely to be more optimistic in FM than in CT.
Hypothesis 3 For a given suggestion/choice of the leader, the eort choices of the followers are higher in FM than in CT, and they are higher in Prevent than in Restore.
We also argued in section 2 that a leader's suggestion is expected to be higher in CT than a leader's choice in FM. Some leaders may realize that, with repeated interactions, not following their own suggestion would reduce the focality eect of it, thus they may decide to suggest the eort they are actually going to choose. In this case, it cannot be optimal to suggest (and therefore do) less than what a player would have chosen in the simultaneous game. The actual choice of the leader in both treatments should be above the corresponding choice in Baseline.
Hypothesis 4 The suggestion of leaders in CT is higher than the choice of leaders in FM. The eort choice of leaders in CT and FM is higher than in Baseline.
In the next section we look at the data from the experiment and test these hypotheses.
Results
We rst present an overview of group outcomes over time in our treatments. We then look at the individual behavior of the subjects and try to determine what role is played by leaders and followers during the coordination process.
22 In the experiment, we have repeated interaction rather than a one-shot game. There is no obvious reason why assumptions 1 and 2 would not hold with repeated interactions. Subjects may have preferences dierent from the risk-neutral own-payo-oriented preferences used in the analysis. However, risk aversion is expected to preserve the assumption F
(k|L) due to the reduced strategic uncertainty in FM. Reciprocity motives would also tend to preserve assumption 1. 
Group eort and coordination with and without leadership
In the analysis below, rst we look whether the mechanisms were successful in the toughest environment, after a history of coordination failure in Restore sessions. Then we look at their performance in preventing coordination failure (Prevent sessions). Finally, we discuss how the timing of the introduction of the mechanisms aected their performance and inuenced overall payos.
Trying to overcome coordination failure
For the Restore sessions, a low eort level serves as a necessary condition to analyze the eectiveness of leadership in overcoming coordination failure. We consider as a coordination failure the situation in which the minimum eort in a group is zero in round 10. Indeed, during the rst ten rounds in Control and Restore sessions, there is a clear trend towards lower eort levels, as seen in gure 1, and the minimum eort is zero in 32 out of 35 groups in round ten.
23 There is no signicant dierence between CT, FM and Control treatments in the rst ten rounds, reecting the identical design setup across those treatments (the smallest p-value of the two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank-sum tests is 0.111 in round-by-round comparisons of group average or group minimum eorts across pairs of treatments).
The results from the rst block in Restore and Control sessions conrm the ndings in the previous literature (Brandts and Cooper, 2006 , 2007 , Hamman et al., 2007 , Brandts et al., 2014 . Coordination failure after ten rounds is not surprising if one realizes how tough the environment is. The cost of not being the minimum-eort player is high in this environment, compared with the benets of In the analysis below we focus on the 32 groups in which coordination failure occurred. Starting from round 11, groups in Restore sessions face a mechanism (either CT or FM). One can expect that players would increase their eort in round 11 compared with the eort they chose in round Figure 2 shows the distribution of choices in round 11 and the average payo obtained for each choice in these groups.
With a leadership mechanism, group average eorts are signicantly higher in round 11 than in round 10 (p-value of the two-sided Wilcoxon matched-pairs sign-rank test < 0.001). Group minimum eorts are only marginally signicantly dierent though between rounds 10 and 11 (two-sided pvalue 0.083), and the right panel in gure 2 shows that players choosing lower eorts still had higher payos. Thus it is not surprising that this increase in average eort is short-lived as gure 3
shows: we observe an irreversible decrease in eort level during the second block. All groups that were trapped in coordination failure in round 10 also experience it in round 20.
24 As can be seen from the gure, there are no clear dierences between CT and FM treatments and statistical tests conrm this (minimum p-value for the two-sided rank-sum tests on average group eorts is > 0.1 for all rounds except round 15 where p = 0.028; for tests on minimum group eort in rounds 11-20 the minimum p-value is 0.299).
The increase in eort in round 11 may come partly from a restart eect, as often happens in similar experiments (Brandts and Cooper, 2006 , Hamman et al., 2007 , Brandts et al., 2014 , Le Lec et al., 2014 . There is a visible restart eect in Control treatment in gure 3 but it is much smaller than in CT and FM treatments, thus the increase in eort after the mechanism is introduced is only partly explained by the restart eect. Although average group eort in (pooled) CT and FM treatments is not signicantly higher than in Control in round 11 (p-value of the one-sided rank-sum test is 0.106) and only marginally signicantly higher in round 12 (p-value of the one-sided rank-sum test is 0.064), the dierence is perceptible in the gure in rounds 11 and 12.
Following Cooper (2006, 2007) , we use regression analysis to tease out possible treatment eects. For the minimum group eort it is clear from gure 3 that there are no treatment dierences; indeed there is too little variability in the data for a meaningful regression analysis.
24 There are three groups who coordinated on a non-zero eort level in the rst ten rounds, and they continued to coordinate on that level for the rest of the experiment. 
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The regressions are run for data from rounds 6-20. In order to distinguish between earlier and later rounds of the second part of the experiment, we use a dummy variable for rounds 11-12 and another one for rounds 13-20. To control for group or individual history, we include the group average eort or the individual eort in round 1. Table 3 shows the results of the regressions.
The rst two columns compare how eort changes with respect to rounds 6-10. The regressions conrm that there was an increase in eort in the short run (rounds 11-12) but not in the long run (rounds 13-20). The magnitude of the increase in rounds 11-12 is higher in FM than in CT, which in turn is higher than the restart eect in Control. The last two columns conrm that the eect of the introduction of the mechanisms goes beyond the simple restart eect. Compared with rounds 11-12
in Control, the mechanisms, especially FM, increased eort more. The value of the group average eort in round 1 did not signicantly aect the group average eort in rounds 6-20; however, for individuals their behavior in round 1 appears to have a positive eect for their eort in subsequent rounds.
Result 1 After a history of coordination failure, the mechanisms (especially FM) increase average 25 We also tried a tobit and an ordered probit specication for regressions with group average eort as dependent variable and a random-eects regression for individual eort. The signicance of the coecients stays broadly the same. eort in the short run but not in the long run. They do not have a signicant eect on group minimum eort.
We therefore conclude that the strong form of hypothesis 1 (that mechanisms strictly increase eort)
is not conrmed after a history of coordination failure. Could our mechanisms have prevented coordination failure if they were available from the beginning? The next subsection looks at this question.
Preventing coordination failure
We saw in the previous subsection that neither of the leadership mechanisms was successful in overcoming coordination failure in groups that experienced it. In our Prevent sessions, one of the lower eorts got on average a higher payo. We have seen in the previous subsection that in these treatments almost all groups converged to the lowest-eort equilibrium. From the right panels of gure 5, in round 1 of Prevent sessions average payos still tend to decline with eort but sometimes a higher eort leads to a higher payo. The possibility of getting a higher payo by choosing a higher eort arises because of the correlation of the choices of the followers.
Note that the average eort of the followers in round 1 is higher in CT than in FM, while the average eort of the leaders is the same in both treatments. Recall that in CT treatments leaders could choose an eort dierent from the number they suggested; in fact, 6 out of 14 leaders did so in round 1, thus the average suggestion in CT (which is 30.00) is higher than the average eort by the leaders in either CT or FM (21.43). Since followers mostly matched the suggestion (29 out of 42 followers chose eort equal to the suggested number), this resulted in a higher average eort by followers in CT than in FM. The deceptive behavior of leaders is, of course, likely to lead to a decrease of eort in the future in their group. The evolution of average and minimum group eorts over the rst 10 rounds in Prevent sessions, separately for CT and FM treatments, can be seen in gure 6. There appears to be no signicant Taking rounds 1 to 10, pooling CT and FM in Prevent sessions and comparing with Control and Restore sessions (i.e. with the simultaneous game without mechanisms), there is a signicant dierence in average group eort in each round after round 4 (all p-values < 0.05 for the one-sided rank-sum tests for rounds 4-10). The average minimum eort in Prevent sessions is stable around 10 and is signicantly higher than in Control and Restore sessions for each round after round 2, according to the one-sided rank-sum tests (for all these rounds p < 0.05). As Cartwright et al. (2013) and Sahin et al. (2015) found in dierent parametrizations of the minimum eort game, we also observe that both CT and FM mechanisms have some ability to raise average and minimum eort. Do the eects of the mechanisms persist after the mechanism is removed? One can expect that because of a lock-in in an equilibrium, most subjects would continue to choose the same eort in round 11 as in round 10. Nevertheless, some subjects may increase their eort due to the restart eect discussed earlier; other subjects may reduce their eort due to beliefs being aected by the On the other hand, 9% (5 out of 56) of subjects reduced their eort in CT and 7% (4 out of 56) in FM. Overall, for FM treatment, the average eort level in round 11 is signicantly higher than in round 10 (p-value of the two-sided sign-rank test 0.047); for CT treatment this dierence is not signicant. However, the average minimum eort goes down between rounds 11 and 10 (see gure 6), and this dierence is marginally signicant in FM treatment (p-value of the two-sided sign-rank test is 0.084); for CT treatment the dierence is also negative but not signicant. Of the 9 groups that achieved a non-zero minimum eort in round 10, only 6 groups still have a positive minimum eort in round 11. Thus the removal of the correlation device (the suggestion or the choice by the leader) has an immediate eect on the ability to avoid zero minimum eort in some groups. By the end of the experiment (round 20), only 5 groups still maintain a minimum eort higher than zero. Similarly to the previous subsection, we use regression analysis to check the medium-and long-term eects of the mechanisms. Table 4 reports the regressions of group minimum and average eort, 27 For the minimum group eort regression, in rounds 11-20 in the Control session the minimum was always zero, implying perfect predictability; these data are excluded from the regression.
We nd that the mechanisms have some eect in rounds 6-10, especially FM that has higher coecients and is more consistently signicant. This conrms the previous nding that the mechanisms increased eort in the medium run. The regressions also conrm the short-term eect of introducing mechanisms in Restore sessions (rounds 11-12) found in the previous subsection. The regressions further corroborate the observation that the eect of the mechanisms in Prevent sessions persists only for a short time after the mechanism is removed and only for average eort rather than for minimum eort. In the long term there are no signicant eects of the mechanisms, either in Prevent or in Restore sessions. In Prevent sessions, after the removal of the mechanisms, eorts are not signicantly dierent from those of rounds 6-10 in Control and Restore. In Restore sessions, as was observed before and the regressions here conrm, eorts in rounds 13-20 are also not signicantly dierent from the baseline, even though the mechanisms are present in those periods.
Result 2 The leadership mechanisms have some ability to prevent coordination failure but there is no lasting eect after the mechanisms are removed.
Timing of the mechanisms and welfare
The Result 3 The eectiveness of the leadership mechanisms is higher if these mechanisms are introduced early.
As we have seen in the previous subsections, the mechanisms have a positive eect on average eort.
Choosing a higher eort might induce a group to coordinate on a more ecient equilibrium. However, 
Individual behavior
Recall that in our analysis of possible leadership eects we talked about followers' reactions to leader's suggestion or choice. One innovative aspect of our design is the use of the strategy method to elicit followers' contingent strategies. From our discussion of leadership eects in section 2, followers are expected to be responsive to the leader's suggestion/choice compared with the choices players would make in the simultaneous game, and more so in FM than in CT (our assumption 1). For any given suggestion/choice of the leader, we nd that the dierence in followers' choices between CT and FM is not signicant in round 1 of Prevent sessions, but the pooled distribution of follower's choices in CT and FM is signicantly higher than the distribution of choices of players in the simultaneous game.
30 Similarly, 28 Note that the strategies in the gure are consistent with our assumption 2 in section 2. Followers do not choose zero more often after a higher suggestion/choice of the leader and their non-zero choices match the leader's choice, thus their distribution of eorts shifts toward a higher eort.
29 Choosing an eort above what the leader chooses or suggests might seem irrational but may be done either in expectation that the leader will actually choose a high rather than a low eort (thus what the follower chooses for a low eort of the leader is irrelevant), or in order to teach the leader the virtue of choosing a high eort. Therefore strategies that choose more than the leader are counted together with the matching strategy. Followers are also expected to be more responsive to the leader's suggestion/choice in Prevent sessions compared with Restore sessions. In order to include this comparison, since the choices of the followers in a group are not independent after round 1, we take, for a given suggestion/choice of the leader, the average choice of the followers in the same group over all ten rounds as a measure of responsiveness of the followers in this group. This gives us, for each treatment (CT-Restore, CT-Prevent, FM-Restore, FM-Prevent), as many independent observations as there are groups in the treatment. With this measure, for each possible suggestion/choice of the leader, we are able to reject the hypothesis that there are no dierences between the four treatments (maximum p-value of the Kruskal-Wallis tests is 0.022). In pairwise comparisons of the treatments, the most signicant dierences are found between CT-Restore and CT-Prevent, and FM-Restore and FM-Prevent. When we pool CT and FM treatments and compare Restore with Prevent sessions, we nd a signicantly higher responsiveness in Prevent sessions (the largest p-value of the one-sided tests is 0.006). When we pool Restore and of the leader (for example, L = 30), we look only at the distribution of choices in the simultaneous game that do not exceed L. Prevent sessions and compare CT with FM, the responsiveness in FM is also signicantly higher than in CT (the largest p-value of the one-sided tests is 0.038). Thus we nd support for our hypothesis 3.
We also run regressions of followers' choices on leader's suggestion/choice, including treatment dummies, separately for period 1 in Prevent (and period 11 in Restore), and for all other periods where we also include the history of the group represented by the minimum eort in the previous round and a time trend. Table 5 reports the results of ordered probit and random-eects regressions. Result 4 On average, followers match a leader's increase in eort only partially. For a given suggestion/choice of the leader, the eort choices of the followers are higher in FM than in CT, and they are higher in Prevent than in Restore.
Leaders' choices
In the previous subsection we looked at the decisions of the followers. How did the leaders make their choices in our experiment? In our FM treatment leaders simply choose eort; in CT treatment leaders also suggest a number that is seen by their followers but they could choose an eort dierent from the suggested number. In all treatments, leaders also state their beliefs about what they expect the minimum eort of the followers to be. Figure 10 shows average leaders' eort choices, suggestions and beliefs in each round, together with the average group minimum eort in the round.
One can see from the gure that the average eort choices of the leaders do not dier much across treatments. Recall that from our theoretical discussion in section 2 we could not make an unambiguous prediction about in which of the two mechanisms leaders would choose a higher eort. The two-sided rank-sum tests on leader's eort choices nd no dierences between CT and FM treatments, either in round 1 of Prevent, round 11 of Restore, or averaging each leader's choices over all ten rounds of a mechanism. Pooling CT and FM together and comparing the averages of leaders' eort choices in the ten rounds of Prevent and Restore sessions, we nd that leaders in Prevent choose a signicantly higher eort than in Restore (p-value of one-sided rank-sum test is 0.042).
According to hypothesis 4, we expect that the eort of leaders in the mechanisms would be no lower than the eort of players in the simultaneous game. Although in round 1 of Prevent sessions there is no signicant dierence of leader's eorts from those in round 1 of the simultaneous game (i.e. Restore and Control sessions), the one-sided rank-sum test on the average eorts over ten rounds (averaging all players in a group in the simultaneous game) nds that eorts by leaders are marginally signicantly higher (p-value is 0.075). In Restore sessions, looking at the leaders with a history of coordination failure compared with the simultaneous game in the Control treatment we nd that leaders' eort is signicantly higher in round 11 (p-value of the one-sided rank-sum test is 0.014). This provides some evidence in support of the hypothesis. CT and eorts in FM by the leaders. One may expect that the leader would be more responsive to his/her own message than the followers; this is not always the case in the data. The average actual eort of leaders in CT-Prevent is lower than that of the followers (14.79 vs 16.76), implying that the leaders followed their own suggestion (on average 22.64) even less than their followers did. This dierence is not signicant though, according to the sign-rank test on eorts of leaders and followers averaged over ten rounds.
To get more insight into leaders' decisions, we use regression analysis. Unlike followers, leaders did not have a suggestion or choice of another player to base their decisions on; the amount of information they have available is similar to that of players in the simultaneous game. We therefore combine leaders' eort choices with those of players that did not experience a leadership mechanism (rounds 1-10 in Restore and Control sessions and rounds 11-20 in Control session in our experiment).
In the rst two columns of table 6 we report the results of random-eects regressions of eort choices on treatment dummies, group history and a time trend.
32 The regressions are done separately for rounds 1 and 11 (rst rounds in a block), and for the other rounds.
The regressions conrm that there is little dierence in leaders' eorts across treatments; they also do not nd a signicant dierence in eorts between the rst ten rounds of the simultaneous game and the leaders' eorts in Prevent. The signs of the coecients show that leaders' eorts were not below the choices in the simultaneous games, not contradicting hypothesis 4. The only signicant 32 An ordered probit specication produces similar signicance results. We also tried including interaction terms and lagged eort in the regression; the results stay broadly similar. dierence is that the eorts in the second ten rounds of the simultaneous game are lower than the eorts of the leaders. Analogously to the followers' regressions, the history of the group, summarized by the minimum eort in the previous round, plays a large role in the eort choice of the leader, and there is a downward time trend.
The last two columns in table 6 regress leaders' suggestions (in CT) and choices (in FM) on treatment dummies and the other variables. Although in rounds 1 and 11 we are not able to detect signicant dierences between suggestions and eorts, over all ten rounds of the mechanisms the suggestions of the leaders in CT-Prevent are found to be signicantly higher than the leaders' eorts in FMPrevent, while there is little dierence for the other treatments. Since the eorts of the leaders are not signicantly dierent across treatments, this conrms the previous evidence that in CT leaders often put a higher suggestion than the eort they choose.
Result 5 Eorts of the leaders are similar in the two leadership mechanisms, and only marginally higher than the eorts of players in the simultaneous game. In CT-Prevent treatment, leaders, similarly to their followers, do not follow their own suggestion to the full extent.
Coordination failure: leader's or followers' responsibility?
Knowing followers' strategies, we can see if it would have been possible for leaders (or for individual followers) to achieve a higher group eort by unilaterally changing their choice (and possibly the suggestion in CT). We nd that if the leader had chosen a dierent eort level (and corresponding suggestion in CT), the minimum eort in 22 out of 58 groups would have increased in the rst round for which the leader-follower setup is implemented (i.e. round 11 in Restore sessions and round 1 in Prevent sessions). Despite the fact that many groups' eort level could be increased if the leader had chosen dierently, there are also many cases where leaders end up with an eort higher than the minimum eort of their followers (29 out of 58 groups).
33 Therefore, if the followers would choose dierently, those 29 groups could have a higher minimum eort level.
Given the distribution of the followers' choices, we ask what the expected payo for leaders would be from choosing various eort levels (in FM) or suggesting various numbers and following them (in CT). The leader's expected payo is calculated as follows: using followers' choices collected by the strategy method, we calculate the distribution of the minimum eort of three randomly selected followers for each possible choice of the leader, and use this distribution to nd the leader's expected payo for each choice. We also do this for the followers, calculating expected payos a follower would get from following various possible choices or suggestions of the leader. For this, we take into account the probability distribution for the choices of the other two followers in the group, randomly chosen from the observed population of followers. Figure 11 shows the leader's and a follower's expected payo calculated in this way.
In all panels of the gure, the highest payo corresponds to eort 0. The two left panels are for leaders. Expected payos are higher in Prevent sessions than in Restore sessions for each eort level, reecting the fact that followers more often chose to match the leader's suggestion or choice in Prevent. In Restore, the leader's payo would have been higher in FM than in CT for each corresponding eort choice; leaders in Prevent would have expected a higher payo in CT than in FM for each corresponding eort choice. Zero eort is, nevertheless, still the optimal choice for the leaders in all treatments. The two right panels are for the follower's expected payo. Again, for all eort levels strictly higher than 0, the expected payos are lower than the payo 200 that a player could guarantee by always choosing 0. Note here that the payos of followers are calculated for cases in which the leader would choose (in FM) or suggest and choose (in CT) the given eort level and the follower would follow that leader's choice. What the gure thus shows is that fully following the leader's suggestion/choice is not optimal even for a risk-neutral follower (and even if CT leaders always followed their own suggestion). The uncertainty arising from the decisions of only two (rather than three as for the leader) other followers in a group is still suciently high, so that the expected payo of a follower is lower than 200 (the highest expected payo from a non-zero 33 Note that a low minimum group eort could be both leader's and followers' fault. Result 6 Given the population distribution of followers' choices, neither the leader nor a follower would individually be better o in expected terms in the rst round of the mechanisms by choosing an eort other than 0.
The main blame for this observation lies with followers: the proportion of them playing the All0 strategy is too high for any positive eort to be protable. Leaders are also partially to blame though: their persistent failure to follow their own suggestion in CT may be a reason why not all followers follow the leader's suggestion, and in many groups a dierent leader's choice could have increased the minimum eort. Overall, it is a collective failure: players could not unilaterally have increased their expected payo by choosing a higher eort, thus it was individually rational to choose the safe option of zero eort.
Conclusion
We analyzed the eects of two leadership mechanisms (pre-play communication and leading-byexample) in a tough parametrization of the minimum eort game. In this challenging environment, the mechanisms failed to overcome coordination failure and had only limited eectiveness in pre-venting it. The mechanisms did have some eect in the short-run as some players attempted to choose a higher eort but in the long-run most players fell back to the lowest possible eort.
In both leadership mechanisms a substantial proportion of followers chose the eort level corresponding to the leader's suggestion or choice. Followers appeared to follow the leader more in the rst-mover mechanism than in the cheap-talk mechanism. They also followed the leader more without a history of coordination failure. However, in each treatment, there was also a considerable number of followers who, instead of following the leader, always chose zero eort, irrespective of the suggestion or choice of the leader. Since the group outcome depends on the minimum eort in the group, the presence of just one such player often led in the long run to the group falling back to the lowest eort. Given the non-negligible proportion of such players in our data, we found that the expected payo of both leaders and followers would be maximized by choosing zero eort.
Our results delineate the limits of the leadership mechanisms for preventing and overcoming coordination failure. Despite the game possessing a payo-dominant Nash equilibrium, in our tough environment the mechanisms were not sucient to overcome coordination failure and their eectiveness in preventing it was rather limited. Our mechanisms involved a quite minimal implementation:
our leaders were randomly chosen and communication consisted of a single number (interpreted as a suggestion of eort); more complicated mechanisms are needed to enable players to avoid coordination failure in this game.
Appendix: Experimental Instructions (for CT-Restore Sessions)
General Information and Payments:
The purpose of this experiment is to study how people make decisions in a particular situation.
From now until the end of the experiment, any communication with other participants or use of mobile phones is not permitted. If you have a question, please raise your hand and one of us will come to your desk to answer it.
This experiment will have several parts. In each part there will be several rounds. You will earn some points each round during the experiment. Upon completion of the experiment the total amount of points will be converted into pounds, and will be paid to you in cash.
The conversion rate is 400 Points = 1 Pound.
Payments will be condential, i.e., no other participant will be told the amount you make. To ensure your anonymity, your actions in this experiment are only linked to your participant ID number contained in the white envelope. Now, please enter your participant ID number on the screen.
Description of the Decision Task in a Round in Part I of the Experiment:
In Part I there will be ten rounds. After these ten rounds have nished, we will give you instructions for the next part of the experiment. In each round you will be in a group with three other participants.
The participants you are grouped with will be the same in all rounds of Part 1.
You and the other members of your group are employees of a rm. You can think of a round of the experiment as being a workweek. In each week, each of the employees in the rm spends 40 hours at the rm. You have to choose how to allocate your time between two activities, Activity A and Activity B. Specically, you will be asked to choose how much time to devote to Activity A. The available choices are 0 hours, 10 hours, 20 hours, 30 hours, and 40 hours. Your remaining hours will be put toward Activity B. For example, if you devote 30 hours to Activity A, this means that 10 hours will be put toward Activity B.
Payos:
The payo that an employee receives in a round depends on the number of hours he/she chooses to spend on Activity A and the number of hours chosen by the others in his/her rm to spend on Activity A.
The payo (in points) for the i th employee of the rm, π i , is given by the formula below where H i is the number of hours spent by the i th employee of the rm on Activity A, and min(H A ) is the smallest number of hours an employee of the rm spends on Activity A. You do not need to memorize this formula the computer program will give you payo tables at any point where you need to make a decision:
Information that you will receive:
After each round you will be informed about the number of hours you have spent on Activity A, the lowest number chosen by all of the employees in your rm, your payo for the latest round, and your accumulated payos through the current round. You will also be shown your decisions and the decisions of all the other employees of your group for the current round. These decisions will be sorted from lowest to highest, and will not include any identifying information about which employee was responsible for which choice (see Screenshot 2).
Screenshot 2 (Numbers are provided for explanatory purposes only)
Instructions for Part 2:
In Part 2, there will be ten rounds. In all rounds, you will still be grouped with the same three individuals as in Part 1 of the experiment. However, ONE of you will be randomly chosen to play the role of Employee X and the other THREE group members will play the role of Employee Y. You will learn whether your role is Employee X or Employee Y at the start of Part 2. These roles will remain xed during the entire Part 2. The prot table will be the same as in Part 1.
First, Employee X suggests a number for the group each round. He/she will also make a choice of how many hours to spend on activity A. Note, however, that the choice of how many hours to spend on activity A is the one used to calculate the points, and it could be dierent from the suggested number. This suggested number will be available to the other group members.
Employee X will also make an estimate about the minimum number of hours that the other three employees will choose to spend on activity A in response to his/her suggested number (see screenshot 3). There will be 20 extra points for each correct estimate. Those points will be added up at the nal payment stage.
Screenshot 3.
